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agreement like a contract is, at best, questionable. Notwithstanding that
the parties may provide remedies, the Act's failure to adequately resolve
the problems created by the slowdown is without justification. There
have been indications that no-slowdown clauses may be decreasing in
frequency. 5
At present, the LMRA affords no effective relief from the slow-
down. The Board and the courts can go no further to bring this un-
justified tactic within the scope of the Act. Therefore, prohibition of
the slowdown should be included within the provisions of Section 8(b)
of the LMRA. Such regulation would accomplish, at least, two advan-
tageous objectives: It would establish an express national policy on slow-
downs; and it would permit the NLRB to issue appropriate remedial
orders to unions engaged in this practice. If the slowdown were to be in-
cluded within Section 8(b) as an unfair labor practice, the unions and the
employees would lose no legal or moral rights,56 for only the adequacy
of remedies given an employer against this admittedly unfairly coercive
device would be affected. By affirmative action Congress can dispel the
existing confusion and provide a more certain and exact method of
alleviating the injustices of the slowdown.
CORPORATE DONATIONS: COMMON LAW, STATUTORY,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
An estimated three hundred million dollars are deducted from corpo-
rate tax returns each year as donations to charity,1 although seventy years
55. Unions may shy away from the use of no-strike provisions because of damage
liability for contract breaches. There is another indication that the no-slowdown clause
may decrease in use because of the NLRB's holding that the clause is an absoite prohi-
bition. For example, if the employer engages in an unfair labor practice, a union
may attempt to retaliate by slowing down or striking in violation of its contract rather
than go to the Board for relief. Suppose, then, the employer discharges the employees
for striking in breach of the contract. The Board has upheld such discharges. The
Board contends the union should have sought aid from it and not attempted self-help
action. For a full discussion of the preceding material, see Blinn, stepra note 40, at 281.
56. It is true unions would lose the opportunity to hold the slowdown before the
employer as a possible contract clause and demand concessions for inclusion of a no-
slowdown provision in the collective agreement. But as has been indicated, the slowdown
is both legally and morally frowned upon; consequently, losing this opportunity can
hardly be considered as losing any right.
1. ANDuRws, CORPORATION GIVING 15 (1952). This figure is based on corporate
income tax returns. It is believed that many dollars are listed as necessary and ordinary
business expenses although they resemble a "gift" more than a true expense. Id. at 41.
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ago a classic decision prohibited corporations from making donations.2
Primarily responsible for this change is the increasing social pressure
being applied to force corporations to assume a major role in community
welfare.3 This pressure has found expression in the federal tax policy
toward corporate gifts. Congress encourages corporate donations by
allowing corporations to deduct a maximum of 5 percent of their net
income for such contributions.4  Indeed, corporate control of a large
For a discussion of this confusion of gift and expense from a common law point of
vantage, see note 13 infra.
Surprisingly, corporations donate only 5 percent of the total receipt of charitable
funds. ANDREWS, 10C. cit. supra, at 19. See also note 4 infra.
Another fact of interest is that there is an inverse ratio of net income to percentage
of contribution. The small corporations donate a greater portion of their profit than
the large ones. ANDREWS, loc. cit. supra, at 44.
A breakdown of the purposes for which corporations donate shows that thirty-one
percent of the total contribution is given to community chests, eighteen percent to hos-
pitals, 10 percent to colleges and universities, 4 percent to other educational institutions,
1 percent to national health agencies, and twenty-six percent to other charities. Id. at 69.
For additional material on corporate donations generally, see THE MANUAL OF Coiro-
RATE GIVING (Ruml ed. 1952).
2. "It is not charity sitting at the board of directors, because, as it seems to me
charity has no business to sit at the board of directors qua charity." Hutton v. West
Cork Ry., 23 Ch. D. 654, 673 (1883) (concurring opinion). A distinction is to be noted
here between the charitable donation sought to be made in the above case (an outright
gift to a director of the corporation which was being wound up) and a donation to a
charitable organization. "Charitable donation" will be used in the latter sense through-
out this discussion.
It is ironical that the case which has been pointed to as an example of the common
law prohibition against corporate giving contains dicta which approves corporate giving
if it is in any way to the benefit of the corporation. Id. at 665-666, 672. Perhaps this
case is sound law today and in accord with Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921]
1 Ch. 359, rather than contrary to it as is often supposed.
The recognized American precedent for the common law prohibition of corporate
giving is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
3. "Absolute power is useful in building the organization. More slow, but equally
sure is the development of social pressure demanding that the power shall be used for
the benefit of all concerned. This pressure, constant in ecclesiastical and political his-
tory, is already making its appearance in many guises in the economic field." BERLE AND
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 353 (1948).
"It is conceivable,-indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to
survive,-that the control of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral
technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather
than private cupidity." Id. at 356.
See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 7 (Rev. ed. 1946) ; ANDREws, CoRPoRATIoN GIVING
113-114; Geiger, Public Policy and the Five Percent in THE MAxuAL OF CORPORATE
GIVING 3 (Ruml ed. 1952); H. R. E'. No. 2514, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1953);
Navarro, Corporate Authority to Contribute to Charity, 26 PHIL. UJ. 187 (1951);
Burck, The Jersey Company, Fortune, Oct., 1951, p. 98.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 23(q) (Supp. 1951). The importance of this statute is emphasized
when one realizes that the corporation expends only forty-eight to eighteen cents-
depending on the income group to which it belongs-from each dollar of net income
it donates up to the 5 percent maximum deduction. The remainder is, in effect, con-
NOTES
portion of the nation's wealth,6 coupled with fewer personal fortunes,6
emphasizes the need for facilitating donations to charity.
Accordingly, twenty-nine states have enacted legislation designed to
overcome the common law prohibition against corporate gifts. 7 The
absence of a precise holding8 in the remaining states leaves the extent
of the common law prohibition in doubtY Originally, the lack of a
"direct benefit" to the corporation from the expenditure rendered the
donation without the scope of implied and incidental powers and, there-
fore, ultra vires.' 0
tributed by the government in the form of tax deduction. Consequently, a corporate
gift need produce only eighteen to forty-eight cents profit to match the full dollar-for-
dollar value which advertising, for instance, must produce to benefit the corporation.
That this policy has been effective as a stimulant to corporate giving is evidenced
by the fact that corporate donations today are ten times the amount they were in 1936
when Section 23(q) of U.S.C. became effective. ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING 15.
Nevertheless, corporations in general do not yet make contributions which even approxi-
mate the permissible 5 percent maximum. In only one year since 1936 has the ratio of
net profit to contributions been as high, nationally, as 1.24 percent. Id. at 42.
5. "There can be little doubt that the wealth of the large corporations has been
increasing at a very much more rapid rate than the total national wealth." BERLE AND
MEANS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 40.
6. ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVImNG 20. Graduated income taxes, large estate taxes,
and public antipathy toward excessively wealthy people each contribute to the rarity of
this form of wealth.
7. Id. at 235.
8. A recent New Jersey case attempts to delineate the modern common law view.
However, a statute authorizing corporate gifts, passed in conjunction with a reserve
statute, was also claimed as a basis for the corporate gift. The court's decision, approv-
ing gifts made in the public interest, is apparently based on a combination of the common
law and the statute, and, accordingly, the standing of the common law prohibition
remains somewhat in doubt. See A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N. J.
1953) semble. For further discussion of this case see note 33 infra and accompanying
text
9. De Capriles and Garrett, Legality of Corporate Support to Education: A Sur-
vey of Current Developnents, 38 A.B.A.J. 209, 210 (1952) ; Rudick, Legal Aspects, of
Corporate Giving in THE MANUAL OF CORPORATE GIVING 35, 43 (Rum1 ed. 1952). As
Mr. Rudick points out, the scarcity of cases coupled with the fact that corporate dona-
tions are everywhere accepted as commonplace, indicate an environment conducive to
approval of reasonable corporate gifts. Ibid. An opinion research survey found that
seventy-six percent of community leaders who own stock approve of corporate giving.
Meeting the Problem of Charitable Contributions, The Public Opinion Research Cor-
poration, Princeton, 1948, as quoted in ANDREWS, CoRPoRATIoN GIVING 18.
10. Compare Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919),
with: "It seems to us that this must be the test: If the direct and proximate tendency
of the improvements sought to be obtained by the donation is the building up of the town,
and the enhanced value of the remaining property of the corporation, the donation is not
ultra vires." Whetstone v. Ottawa University, 13 Kans. 240, 255 (1874) (land donated
by realty company for purposes of setting up a college). The rule set up in Armstrong
Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 Fed. 58, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 1922) is less stringent:
"In the circumstances the rule of law that may fairly be applied is that the action of
the officers of the company [subscribing to college fund drive] was not ultra vires, but
was in fact within their corporate powers, since it tended to promote the welfare of
the business in which the corporation was engaged."
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Typically, corporate gifts represent a reasonably forseeable benefit
to the corporation," its employes,12 or its customers.' 3 Until a recent
New Jersey Supreme Court decision,14 contributions made simply for
society's general welfare were regularly considered not to be directly
beneficial to the corporation.' 5 This case, which is substantially similar
11. E.g., State ex rel. Sorenson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W.
534 (1924) (donation for goodwill) ; cf. Greene County National Farm Loan Ass'n v.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 57 F. Supp. 783, 789 (1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 215 (6th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 834 (1945) ; In re San Francisco Bay Exposition, 50
F. Supp. 344, 346 (N.D. Calif. 1943) ; but cf. Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258,
259 (1881); see note 13 infra.
12. E.g., Steinway v. Steinway, 17 Misc. Rep. 43, 40 N.Y. Supp. 718 (Sup. Ct.
1896); People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 160, 120
N.Y. Supp. 649 (3d Dep't 1909) ; see note 13 infra.
13. E.g., Willcutts v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 103 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1939), rev'd
on other grounds, 308 U.S. 577 (1939); Fairmount Creamery Corp. v. Helvering, 89
F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1937). These cases permit deductions from tax returns of expendi-
tures made to charitable organizations in the form of contributions. Each donee was
a customer of the donor corporation. The court allowed the deductions as necessary
and ordinary business expenses under the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 23(a).
The argument might be made that a determination for purposes of taxation is not
an adequate determination for purposes of corporate power. This argument is weakened
by the fact that the court has approved the coincidence of the two purposes in a con-
verse situation: A determination for purposes of corporate power is a criterion for tax
purposes. Cf. American Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 41 F.2d 314, 315 (6th
Cir. 1930) ; Corning Glass Works v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 37 F.2d 798, 800 (D.C. Cir.
1929). It is significant to note also that both of the cited cases were decided prior to
1936 when 26 U.S.C. § 23(q) became effective, authorizing corporate donations as such.
Since 1936 deductions under section 23(a) have been limited to those contributions given
to organizations other than those authorized to receive donations under 23(q). Internal
Revenue Bureau Regulation 111, § 2 9.2 3(a)-13, as quoted in 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX
REP. 16313 (Rev. Rul. 160, 1952). See Note, Corporate Charitable Payments, 4 TAx L.
REv. 124 (1948).
There are tax cases buttressing corporate "donations" made for purposes of good
will and general corporate benefit. Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev.,
27 B.T.A. 277 (1932) ; First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 23 B.T.A.
1125 (1931) ; First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 17 B.T.A. 1358 (1929) ;
but cf. Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 90 F.2d 223 (5th
Cir. 1937).
But most of the tax cases concern money donated by corporations for employe
benefit and sought to be deducted under Section 23(a). In the following cases the
deductions were allowed: Lincoln Electric Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 162 F.2d 379
(6th Cir. 1947); American Rolling Mills Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., supra; Coming
Glass Works v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., supra; 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX RE,. 1 6313, supra;
contra, McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 16 T.C. 189 (1951) ; Roberts
Filter Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 10 T.C. 26 (1948) ; Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v.
United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 654 (1929).
For additional cases in this area see, ANDREWS, CoRpoRATioN GIvING 317-327.
14. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
15. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Orpheum Thea-
tre & Realty Co. v. Brokerage Co., 197 Mo. App. 661, 199 S.W. 257 (1917) ; Brinson R.R.
v. Exchange Bank of Springfield, 16 Ga. App. 425, 85 S.E. 634 (1915). There is, how-
ever, an early case approving corporate gifts even for general purposes. State ex rel.,
Sorenson v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 112 Neb. 248, 199 N.W. 534 (1924). There is also
a recent case condoning general donations upon a goodwill basis. Greene County Nat'l
298
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to an English case, 16 concluded that such an expenditure satisfied the
direct benefit test.17 The older view of causal "direct benefit" reflected
the prevalent philosophy that each expenditure must conceivably produce
a traceable return; the new concept manifests a realization that the cor-
porate end-profit-can best be achieved by indirect means under certain
circumstances. Modern society seems to have imposed upon corpora-
tions the obligation of donating to charitable causes in order to function
most profitably.
Those state statutes authorizing corporate gifts' despite the com-
mon law admonition of the necessity for direct benefit raise serious
constitutional problems. Where the "direct benefit" test has been espoused
in the state's case law, a statutory declaration that a corporate gift is
permissible may constitute a violation of the Federal Constitution's
contract clause as defined by the famous Dartmouth College Case.19 Many
states quickly mitigated the effects of that ruling by reserving the right
to alter, amend or repeal corporate charters.20
Farm Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 57 F. Supp. 834 (1944), aff'd
152 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied 328 U.S. 834 (1945).
16. Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., [1921] 1 Ch. 359. The facts in this case are
very similar to those in A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953). The
defendant chemical company voted to distribute from the company's surplus the sum of
100,000£ to various scientific institutions for the furtherance of scientific research. A
minority stockholder objected, asserting that the gift was ultra vires. The court held
that it was not ultra vires but was within the incidental powers of the corporation.
17. Compare Evans v. Brunner, Mond & Co., supra note 16 at 367, with A. P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, supra note 16, at 586. The "direct benefit" terminology is
much more common in tax cases than in cases concerning the corporate power to donate.
E.g., Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 90 F.2d 223, 224 (5th
Cir. 1937); Corning Glass Works v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 37 F.2d 798, 800 (D.C. Cir.
1929) ; Alfred J. Sweet, Inc. v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 654, 660 (1929) ; Capital Trac-
tion Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 27 B.T.A. 926, 927 (1933).
18. ANDRFWS, CORPORATION GIVING 235. The actual statutes are varied in content,
as one might expect. Most of the statutes cover all business corporations, although it is
common to except certain financial and utility corporations. However, Virginia's statute
applies only to utilities. Many of the statutes permit the corporations to donate any
amount which they choose although the majority place some limitations upon the cor-
poration's discretion. Indiana's statute permits only such donations as qualify under
26 U.S.C. § 23(q) (1949). Other states limit the percentage of net income which can
be donated. Some demand that the donation be taken from a special fund. Still others
require that the donation promote corporate interests. For a complete compilation of
these statutes, see ANDREWS, CORPORATION GIVING 293-316.
19. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819). This
case held that a corporate charter is a contract which, when impaired by state legisla-
tion, is afforded the protection of the Federal Constitution. For a comprehensive treat-
ment of the limitations on this decision, see Trimble, Chief Justice Waite and the
Limitations on the Dartunmth College Decision, 9 UNIv. OF CINN. L. REV. 41 (1953)1
20. This reservation at first took two forms: statutes reserving the right or power,
and clauses within the corporate charter itself reserving to the state the right to alter
the charter when it was granted. Later the reserve clause in the corporate charter
dropped out of existence as more and more states chartered corporations by general act
instead of special act; the reserve statute took the form of a section within the general
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The early courts, when construing legislation passed in conjunction
with the authority of reserve statutes, limited application of the latter
to such legislation as did not frustrate or change the. corporate end. 21
Later the limitation preserving the corporate purpose became less popular
as notions of vested rights gained favor.22 The Supreme Court declared
that the reserve statute did not authorize the legislature to alter the
charter so as to deprive the corporation of vested rights. 23 After passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment, property rights also became important
in conjunction with reserve statutes. The Court concluded that vested
property rights could not be taken without just compensation by means
of legislation enacted subject to the authority of reserve statutes ;24
although such laws might be applied prospectively to deprive one of
interests which had not vested.25  However, the term "vested rights"
became so vague with use and abuse that it adds little to any meaningful
analysis of reserve statute problems.
26
Reserve acts, and statutes passed in conjunction with them, have
not, of course, escaped the rational due process limitations imposed on
legislation by the Fourteenth Amendment. 27  Consequently, a statute
authorizing contributions must have rational basis and be reasonably
calculated to effect the end desired by the legislature. 28  Of course, it
has been the recent practice of the Supreme Court almost unfailingly to
act. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-404(b) (Burns Supp. 1953); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:2-9
(1937); see also Onio CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 2.
21. Durfree v. Old Colony R.R., 5 Allen 230 (Mass. 1862). The court reasoned
that, although the state might control corporations in the public interest, it might not
use this power to change the very nature of the stockholder's investment.
22. E.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442 (1931); Berea College v. Kentucky,
211 U.S. 45, 57 (1908); Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 52 (1900); Holyoke Water-
Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500, 519 (U.S. 1872).
23. See e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, supra: note 22; Looker v. Maynard, supra
note 22; Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman, supra note 22. One popular definition of
a vested right was any right necessary to the attainment of the corporate end, which,
obviously, preserves the corporate end. Holyoke Water-Power Co. v. Lyman, supra
at 519.
24. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915); Boston Beer
Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32-3 (1878).
25. See e.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442 (1931) ; St. Louis, I. M. & Southern
R.R. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404, 409 (1898).
26. Cf. Gargo v. Maid of the Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N.Y. 516, 522, 104 N.E.2d
882, 886 (1952); see Lattin, A Primer on Funda'mental Corporate Changes, 1 WEsT.
REs. L. Rmv. 3 (1949).
27. See Trimble, supra note 19, at 65. The effect of a reserve statute seems to be
a nullification of the contract clause, making the only limitations those ordinarily im-
posed on any legislation.
28. "The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as
respects State action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare.
They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power by securing that the end
shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process, as has often been held,
demands only that the law shall not be unreagonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that
Soo
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approve state legislation in the economic field.29 If the gift statute were
questioned upon substantive due process grounds, the considerations
which persuaded the state legislature to act would probably establish thie
rationality of the legislation ;30 that the statute is reasonably calculated
to effect the desired end could hardly be denied unless it fails in its terms
to authorize corporate giving.
A few jurisdictions place an additional limitation on the applicability
of the reserve statute, holding that it is available not to alter the contract
among the stockholders themselves but only the contract between the
corporation and the statea' The reasoning underlying this limitation
is that the reserve statutes were passed to avert the result of the Dart-
mnouth College Case, which was not concerned with the contract between
the state and the stockholder or among the stockholders themselves.3 2
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court probably3 3 abandoned that
the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
It is interesting to note that state courts often deal with legislation under state
provisions for due process. Consequently, any discussion of the problem from the
viewpoint of federal courts must be tempered with the realization that the state courts
may also invalidate legislation for lack of the due process as required by state declaration
or statute. See Note, State Views on Econo~nic Due Process: 1937-1953, 53 COL. L.
REv. 827 (1953).
29. See Note, State Views on Economic Due Process: 1937-1953, 53 COL. L. REV.
827, 829 (1953). See Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L.
Rzv. 512, 885-887 (1944) for a discussion of the views of various Justices of the Supreme
Court concerning the interpretation of "reasonable" legislation.
30. This point has been an issue in numerous substantive due process cases since
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). The trend has been toward giving legislative
declaration wide approval where federal agency orders are questioned on substantive
due process grounds. See Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
31. Dow v. Northern RR, 67 N.H. 1, 36 Atl. 510 (1886); Garey v. St. Joe Mining
Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907). Ohio maintains that statutes violating the obliga-
tions of contracts may not be applied retroactively to the contract between corporations
and their stockholders so as to deprive shareholders of rights already accrued, even
though a general reserve statute exists. Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127,
69 N.E.2d 187 (1946). This holding seems to place Ohio among the states protecting
the minority stockholders' contract rights even where a reserve statute exists.
32. Most states reason that the stockholders assume their contracts with the
knowledge that they can be altered by the legislature and thus have no complaint when
the state reasonably exercises this power. The minority, however, maintains that the
stockholders' contracts, never becoming subject to the reserve power, are-not taken
with the knowledge that they can be altered, and, consequently, stockholders have a
legitimate complaint when their contracts are altered by the state.
33. A qualification is necessary here because the court's holding in relation to the
application of the reserve statute is not clear. Compare: "And since in our view the
corporate power to make reasonable charitable contributions exists under modern con-
ditions, even apart from express statutory provision [emphasis added], its enactments
simply constitute helpful and confirmatory declarations of such power, accompanied by
limiting safeguards." A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953);
with, "We find that it [corporate gift] was a lawful exercise of the corporation's im-
plied and incidental powers under common-law principles and that it came within the
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state's prior position as leader among those jurisdictions which adhered
to this restriction. 34 A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow was brought by
a minority stockholder who asked the court to declare ultra vires a cor-
porate gift of fifteen hundred dollars to Princeton University. 35 The
plaintiff argued that the donation was not authorized by the certificate
of incorporation and that the statute authorizing gifts could not be con-
stitutionally applied to the contract between the stockholders despite the
existence of a reserve statute. The court resolved that the contractual
relationship among the shareholders is no bar to an alteration of the
charter required in the "public interest." 36 If the court's implications
are given full import, the old line of cases protecting the stockholders'
contracts have been severely limited or, perhaps, overruled. Regardless
of implication, the court's holding affords an exception to the rule protect-
ing stockholders' contracts so broad in scope as to be capable of extremely
wide application.
The court's reliance on "public interest" in that case may evidence
a realization of the desirability of extensive legislative control over cor-
porations. "Public interest" language could have been employed merely
as a transitional device by which to adopt the majority rule permitting
alteration of any charter where a reserve statute exists. Additionally,
the appealing and popular cause of permitting corporations to donate
to a respected educational institution perhaps encouraged the court's shift.
Alternatively, the public interest aspect might be explained as an
attempt to justify the gift legislation as rational and reasonably calcu-
lated to produce the end desired. The admitted public interest served by
donations to educational institutions such as Princeton University, tends
to demonstrate the reasonableness of the act. Furthermore, none of the
gift statutes requires that corporations donate to charity but only author-
express authority of the pertinent state legislation." Ibid. If the statute merely
declares the common law, an extension of the application of the reserve statute was
unnecessary. A statute declaratory of the common law obviously does not need the
authorization of a reserve statute to validate it. Indeed, the extension may not be
present in this case since the language does not clearly indicate that such is its finding.
But elsewhere in the opinion the court deals with this extension at such length that
some significance must be given to the dictum, even though it be unnecessary to the
holding. Id. at 587-589.
34. See Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y. R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (1867). This was con-
sidered the leading case which held that the stockholders' contracts inter se could not
be altered even where a reserve statute preceded the enactment which actually altered the
,contract. The facts leading to this rule were: A railroad sought to mortgage its prop-
erty in order to finance an extension of its line. The extension had been authorized by
the New Jersey Legislature. A minority stockholder requested an injunction which was
granted upon the grounds that the statute authorizing the extension impaired the obliga-
tion of the stockholders' contracts inter se.
35. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
36. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, smtpra note 35, at 588.
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izes it to do so; this absence of compulsion appears to substantiate its
reasonableness. It must be noted, however, that the court did not
explicitly express any concern for the substantive due process issue.
Corporate gift statutes might be upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's police power in the absence of a reserve statute. In such case the
contract clause is not reserved away but rather is subjected to the superior
public interest of the state.37 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,38
determined that such legislation, in addition to being rational, 39 must
also be borne of an emergency situation.40 "Emergency" has not developed
into a readily definable concept; a direct holding since the Blaisdell case
is lacking.41 A. P. Smnith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, while not discussing the
issue of emergency in relation to police power and the contract clause,
suggests that an emergency situation is being nurtured from abroad which
requires the continued powerful counteracting influence of our educa-
tional institutions. 42 A policy of furnishing financial sustenance to our
37. E.g., East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945); Viex
v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 39 (1939); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ; Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service Corp.,
248 U.S. 372, 375 (1918) ; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 816-817 (1879) ; Finerty v.
School City of Gary, 213 Ind. 470, 474, 12 N.E.2d 941, 943 (1937).
38. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
39. Id. at 438. The statement in this case was adopted by the court in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934), in the passage generally accepted as defining the
substantive due process limitation today. See note 28 supra.
40. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426-440 (1934) ; Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1920). Once the necessary emergency is found, "[i]t is always
open to judicial inquiry whether the exigency still exists upon which the continued
operation of the law depends." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra at 442.
But cf. "The emergency of the depression may have caused the 1932 legislation but the
weakness in the financial system brought to light by that emergency remains. If the
legislature could enact the legislation as to withdrawals to protect the associations in
that emergency, we see no reason why the new status should not continue." Viex v.
Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 39 (1939). Although the
court will not release its control over whether or not the emergency prompting the
legislation still exists, it suggests a wide latitude when asked to declare it ended.
Assuming, however, that the emergency which gave rise to the legislation must at
the time in question still exist without question, the gift statutes would seem to come
within such a requirement. This conclusion arises from the fact that most of the gift
statutes have been enacted during the last 10 years. Hence, once it is established that
an emergency existed at the time of passage, it is not difficult to demonstrate that the
same emergency continues today. For dates of passage of the gift statutes see ANDREWS,
CORPORATION GVING 293.
41. But see Viex v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Newark, 310 U.S. 32, 39
(1939).
42. A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953). The court's
language here is probably intended to preface the holding that the corporate gift was
to its direct benefit, rather than to justify the gift statute on the basis of an emergency
situation. Nevertheless, the language seems to describe a situation which can be called
"emergency" since it indicates that "threats from abroad" could destroy our "economic
and social environment." There may be no need to discuss emergency in relation to the
contract clause in this case, for the reserve statute may substantially remove the con-
tract clause from consideration and leave only the problem of substantive due process
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colleges and universities is considered one of the chief preventatives of
national decay. 43 Accordingly, gift statutes might be upheld even without
a reserve statute.
While gift statutes appear to satisfy due process requirements, a
problem developing from the date of enactment of the reserve statute
impeded corporate giving in at least one state. When the Indiana General
Assembly passed the first General Corporations Act in 1929, 4 4 the act
did not contain a reserve clause. Nor was there a general reserve statute
in effect prior to its passage, although some corporate charters contained
reserve clauses. 45 This lack of reserve power either went unnoticed or
was considered unnecessary until 1949 when Indiana finally passed a
reserve clause as an amendment to the General Corporations Act.46 On
the same day, the statute authorizing corporate donations was enacted,
also as an amendment to the General Corporations Act.4 7  Since it is
extremely doubtful that a reserve statute can be applied retroactively,4"
for which an emergency situation need not be shown-if the reserve statute is operative.
See note 33 supra.
43. See De Capriles and Garrett, supra note 9, at 209-210. Note particularly the
sources listed at 209, n.3; Geiger, supra note 3, at 8. H.R. REP. No. 2514, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 4-5, 10 (1953).
44. Acts 1929, c. 215, §§ 1-76 (since amended). Prior to this act corporate legisla-
tion usually dealt with types of corporations: e.g., Acts 1853, c. 111 (telegraph com-
panies); Acts 1859, c. 16 (canal companies); Acts 1865, c. 32 (hydraulic companies).
There was, however, a previous attempt to give a specific act general application by
enumerating various types of voluntary associations. See Acts 1901, c. 127.
45. See Denny v. Brady, 201 Ind. 59, 163 N.E. 489 (1928); Indianapolis v. Navin,
151 Ind. 139, 47 N.E. 525 (1898). Oddly enough, both of these cases involved a municipal
transit company which is subject to legislative direction even though no power to alter,
amend, or repeal is reserved. Indianapolis v. Navin, id. at 143, 163 N.E. at 490. A
reserve clause is also found in Acts 1901, c. 127, § 37 (since repealed) which reserved
the right to amend or repeal any part of that chapter. The act concerned voluntary
corporations of various enumerated types. See note 44 supra.
46. "The right of the general assembly to alter, amend, or repeal this act is hereby
expressly reserved, and all corporations formed or coming under this act are subject to
such reserved right. If the application of this section to any corporation, person or cir-
cumstance is held invalid, the application of such provision to any other person, cor-
poration, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby." IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-404(b)
(Burns Supp. 1953).
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-211b (Burns Supp. 1953). An interesting feature of this
corporate gift statute is that it authorizes only such donations as the board of directors
may reasonably believe will be deductible under the Federal Internal Revenue Code.
The power is also subject to any contrary declaration in the articles of incorporation.
These limitations might permit a future corporation to avert statutory authority of
corporate giving, which otherwise could be exercised by the directors without stock-
holder approval, if so provided in its articles at the time of its incorporation.
48. Any attempt to make a reserve statute operate retroactively would be in direct
violation of the rule established in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheat. 518 (U.S. 1819). The Dartmouth College Case held that a corporate charter
was a contract protected by U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10. Obviously, any legislation designed
to overcome this rule is a violation of it, if it be applied retroactively. Even if a
retroactive application of the reserve statute did not violate the Dartmouth College Rule,
to be retroactive in effect the intent of the legislature must be express. Indianapolis &
NOTES
corporations chartered prior to 1949 may not be subject to the reserve
power. Hence, only those corporations chartered under or accepting
the General Corporations Act since 1949 are dearly subject to this reserve
statute.49
Manifestly, the severe limitations imposed upon corporate giving
seventy years ago are being discarded by means most suitable to the
jurisdictions in whith they are exercised. In states, such as Indiana,
where there is no clear common law prohibition against corporate giving,
the most satisfactory method of legalizing donations is by a validating
interpretation of the common law in the light of modem corporate
environment. The stockholder desires today, as he did seventy years
ago, the largest return possible on his investment; the corporation is
still devoted to that end, but modern social pressure demands that dif-
ferent means be used to achieve it. When the law required a direct benefit
for corporate expenditures, it did so with the corporate end and stock-
holders' interests in view. Circumstances have so altered the picture
that a blind adherence to that restriction frustrates rather than furthers
the professed goal. The ability to change under such circumstances has
been extolled as a chief virtue of common law; certainly here is a worthy
opportunity for its exercise. Authorization of corporate giving should
not be distributed blindly by the courts, however. If the directors should
make a gift obviously unreasonable in that it could not possibly benefit
the corporation in any way, certainly that gift should be declared ultra
vires.
Cincinnati R.R. v. Kercheval, 16 Ind. 84, 88-90 (1861); Aurora & Laugherty Turnpike
Co. v. Holthouse, 7 Ind. 59, 61 (1885); Martindale v. Moore, 3 Blackf. 275, 286 (Ind.
1833) ; Lewis v. Brackenridge, 1 Blackf. 220, 221-222 (Ind. 1822). The rationale of
this rule is that law should be a standard of conduct which cannot be observed before
it is known. It would be difficult to find any express retroactive intent in the reserve
statute. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-404(b) (Burns Supp. 1953). The wording, however, does
not preclude a retroactive application or interpretation. Even though it says "hereby
reserved," indicating future application, it continues, "all corporations formed or com-
ing under this act are subject to such reserve right." Is "formed" used in the past
tense? Or should the words "to be" mentally precede it, indicating future or prospective
application? Does "coming" here mean "coming under this act after being formed," or
"subject to the provisions of this ace'? The first interpretation would indicate a pros-
pective intent, the second, a retrospective intent. The second sentence of the act lends
itself to a retroactive application. It carries a flavor of separability which defies explana-
tion unless it be that the legislature, doubting the constitutionality of a retroactive
application of the act, desired to insure that it would not be stricken down for purposes
of prospective application also.
49. The act provides that those corporations chartered prior to its enactment might
bring themselves under its provisions by making a formal acceptance of it. IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-246, 247 (Burns Repl. 1948). Upon acceptance the corporation is subject to
all provisions, both privileges and obligations existing at the time of acceptance. If
accepted after 1949, one of the obligations would be the reserve clause. See IND. ANN.
STAT. § 25-248 (Burns Supp. 1953).
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In those jurisdictions which have expressly declared corporate gifts
ultra vires, re-interpretation of the common law is not feasible; courts
are reluctant to overrule a common law precedent which has been long
recognized. Statutory authorization is especially valuable in such a
situation. If the state's reserve statute antedates the statute authorizing
corporate gifts, there is generally no problem beyond the ordinary due
process requirements. Even in those states which limit the application
of the reserve statute as New Jersey did, A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow
indicates that the limitation may be avoided when the public interest is
involved. Unfortunately, the court's eager use of the common law and
its elusive and vague extension of the reserve statute robs the case of
much of its utility in this area.50 To permit one minority stockholder to
thwart the corporation's desire to accept the varied responsibilities
demanded of modern corporations, and thus lessen the corporation's
chances of producing an eventual maximum profit, seems to defeat the
very purpose of its existence.
As a last resort, the gift statute might be authorized under the
state's police power regardless of the existence of a reserve statute. Invo-
cation of this concept to authorize corporate gift statutes, since it would
impair the obligation of the stockholders' contracts, probably demands
the existence of an emergency situation. Since "emergency" does not
lend itself to precise definition under existing decisions, any use of the
police power for this purpose is precarious.
None of the preceding methods should be used by the courts or
the legislatures merely to impose the will of the general public upon
stockholders. Nevertheless, corporations are institutions integral to our
modern economic structure; their preservation should be an omnipresent
consideration when imposing any economic regulation upon them. Con-
ditions today demand activities uncommon to corporate law of the nine-
teenth century. As the demand then was to prevent corporate gifts in
order to further the corporate end, so the demand now is to permit
corporate gifts in order to further the corporate end.
50. The courts language exhibits a clear desire to authorize the gift at common law.
Its treatment of statutory authorization is correspondingly unclear. The common law
is a familiar vehicle to the court; statutes, on the other hand, are expressions of legisla-
tive intent, subject, at times, to strange interpretations yet not so readily adaptable to the
court's desires. The temptation to deal with the familiar, forsaking the unfamiliar, appears
to have overcome the court. Consequently, the statutory issue is left in doubt. See note 33
supra.
